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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Dumping is broadly defined as exporting goods at prices below those charged on
the domestic market or at prices insufficient to recover the cost of the goods sold 1 .
Dumping has been considered an unfair trading practice which interferes with or distorts
free market economy principles2 . Even though there have been many economic debates
over the fairness of the nature of anti-dumping rules, the anti-dumping actions were the
most popular trade remedy during the 1980s 3 . During that period, anti-dumping measures
were an important issue only for a few developed countries having big and attractive
markets for foreign producers4 . In practice, the four traditional users, the Unites States,
'John H. jacksonet al., Legal Problems OF International Economic Relations 671 (1995).
2
Id. at 668-669.
3
See id. at 673-683. William J. Davey, another author of the book, criticized the economic
rationale of anti-dumping measures in price discrimination and below-cost sales.
According to his view, economic analysis does not justify the application of anti-
dumping duties in international price discrimination situation because consumers in
importing countries are benefited from the price discrimination and subsequent price
wars. In case of below-cost sales, so long as marginal revenue is higher than marginal
cost, below-cost sales are a justifiable business behavior. Thus, it is hard to justify to
penalize most short-run below-cost sales.; see also Michael J. Trebilcock et al., The
Regulation of International Trade 1 12-120 (1995) ( analyzing the economic
justifications for anti-dumping measures in three different types of dumping, such as
international price discrimination, predatory pricing, and intermittent dumping ).
4
Trebilcock et al., supra note 3, at 97.
2the EC, Canada, and Australia, had brought more than 97% of all actions brought from
1980 to 1988 5 .
As one of the four major users, the European Community has developed its own
anti-dumping laws. In the European Community, it is the Community institutions that
have the power to take action against dumped products from third countries6 . This power
stems from Article 1 13 of the EEC Treaty, which provides for a Common Commercial
Policy after the end of the transitional period based on uniform principles including
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the case of dumping or subsidies 7 .
The competence of the Community is exclusive with the exception of new Member
States, which can adopt national measures against dumped goods during the transitional
period 8 . The first regulation was adopted in 1968 9 . It was substantially revised in 1979 as
See id. ("30% were brought by producers in the United States; 27% were brought in
Australia; 22% in Canada; and 19% in the European Union. The target of these actions
are more diverse. The EU was the largest single target, defending 27% of the actions,
while Canada, the USA and Australia in total were targeted in fewer that 14% of the
action").
6
Eugene Creally, judicial Review of Anti-dumping and Other Safe Guard Measures in the
European Community 44 (1992).
1See id. n. 1
:
Prior to the end of the transitional period (1969), the Member States were
competent to apply their own anti-dumping legislation. From 1962 onwards there
was an obligation to consult at Community level. By virtue of article 91 of the
Treaty, the Member States could adopt measures against infra-Community
dumping. This, however, was no longer applicable at the end of the third stage of
the transitional period.
8
Ivo Van Bael & Jean- Francois Bellis, International Trade Law and Practice of the
European Community: Eec Anti-dumpp^g and Other Trade Protection Laws 21 (1986). For
example, Article 133 of the Act of Accession of the United Kingdom and Ireland and
Article 380 of the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal provided for transitional
periods. However, except the special situations, the EC Commission has the exclusive
3a result of the new Anti-dumping Code which was adopted at the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations 10 . Then, the opinion of Advocate General Warner in a
ballbearing case" was adopted in 1984 12 and amended by Regulation 1761/87 13
permitting the Community authorities to impose anti-dumping duties on components of
products which are already subject to duties 14 . Then the Council Regulation 2423/88 15 had
been in effect until it was repealed by the new Regulation 3283/94 16 .
On April 15, 1994, the United States and 1 10 other countries signed the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This
power to take protective measures against dumped imports under Article 9 1 of the EEC
Treaty.
'Council Regulation 459/68, 1968 O.J. (L93) 1.
10
Council Regulation 3017/79 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports from
Countries Not Member of the European Economic Community, 1 979 O.J. (L339) 1.
"Case 1 13/77, NTN Tokyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. EC Council, 1979 E.C.R. 1212.
12
Council Regulation 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on Protection Against Dumped or
Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Member of the European Economic
Community, 1984 O.J. (L201) 1.
13
Council Regulation 1761/87 of 22 June 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84
on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Member of
the European Economic Community, 1987 O.J. (LI 67) 9.
l4
Creally, supra note 6, at 44 n.3.
15
Council Regulation 2423/88 of 1 1 July 1988 on Protection Against Dumped or
Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Member of the European Economic Community,
1988 O.J. (L209)l.
16
Council Regulation 3283/94 of 22 December 1994 on Protection Against Dumped
Imports from Countries Not Member of the European Community, 1994 O.J. (L349) 1
[hereinafter new Regulation]
.
4marked the culmination of approximately seven and half years of negotiation covering the
broadest, most diverse multilateral trade negotiations undertaken in modern history 17 .
The multilateral agreements were great in volume and the results embraced the negotiated
tariff schedules and other market access commitments 18 . The results are made up of
sixteen separate new agreements, eight Understandings and numerous Decisions and
Declarations 19 . The new Anti-dumping Code is one of the multilateral agreements under
the Uruguay Round20 .
The Uruguay Round results brought the establishment of the World Trade
Organization, which, unlike the former GATT, has an institutional personality21 . Under
the WTO, all countries adhering to the WTO Charter become subject to all of the annexed
agreements, except the fourth annex which consists of four optional sub-annexes22 .
Ronald K. Lorentzen, Overview ofMajor Changes Contained in the Uruguay Round
Anti-dumping and Subsidies Agreements 1994 ( PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7074, 1994).
18
David W. Leebron, An Overview ofthe Uruguay Round Results, 34 Colum. J. Transnat'1
L. 11(1995).
]9
Id. at 35 n.2:
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, MTN/FA n,
at 1-14 (Dec. 15„1993), 33 I.L.M. 13(1994), is an agreement among the parties
thereto in their general capacity to enter into international agreements dealing with
trade. All other agreements and understandings are formally among the Members
of the World Trade Organization. Decisions and Declarations are by the Ministers
representing those Member in the World Trade Organization, and presumably
have the status of unanimous decisions of the WTO Ministerial Conference.
20
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 [hereinafter URAA]
.
2
*See Jackson et al
,
supra note 1, at 289-290.
22
Id. at 292. Annexl contains GATT 1994 ( including side agreements, understandings and
5Among others, the changes in dispute settlement process would enhance the degree of the
conformity with the multilateral agreements because violation of the GATT obligations
would bring more serious retaliation against the non-conforming party23 .
In response to the strengthened structure of the WTO both in substantive and
procedural areas, the EC Council adopted a new EC Anti-dumping Regulation
implementing the Uruguay Round Anti-dumping Agreement on 22 December 199424 . The
new Regulation does more than merely incorporate the requirements of the URAA. It also
regulates areas not covered by the URAA, such as anti-circumvention measures.
This article will examine the relevant issues in the past EC anti-dumping
proceedings and compare the past practice with the revised rules in the new Regulation.
Furthermore, the degree of the conformity of the new Regulation with the URAA will be
addressed later in the thesis.
the Marrakesh Protocol), GATS ( The General Agreement on Trade in Service) and
TRIPS (The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).
Annex2 provides new set of Dispute Settlement Rules and Annex3 is dealing with Trade
Policy Review Mechanism. Those three Annexes are integral parts of the WTO
Agreement and binding all member countries.
23
See generally Leebron, supra note 18, 14-16 (important innovations in the new dispute
settlement procedure); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With
Rights :Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 Am. J. Intl L. 477 (1994).
24New Regulation, supra note 16.
CHAPTER n
NEW EC ANTI-DUMPING REGULATION
Before discussing the new Regulation, it is helpful to understand the institutional
structure in the anti-dumping area. There are three Community institutions involved in
the EC anti-dumping proceedings. They are the Commission, the Council of Ministers
(the Council) and the European Court of Justice (the Court of Justice). First of all, it is
the Commission that plays the most important role in the EC anti-dumping proceedings25 .
The Commission is composed of 20 members, who are appointed by unanimous
agreement among the governments of the 15 Member States26 . The Commission decides
all of the major substantive issues through the anti-dumping investigation. The
Commission's investigation covers virtually all of the substantive matters, such as
initiation of investigation, determination of normal value and export price, calculation of
constructed value, determination of dumping margins, determination of injury and so on.
On the other hand, the Council does not engage in the actual investigation.
Instead, the Council's primary role is the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty.
Where an investigation by the Commission shows that there is dumping and injury, and
25
See generally George A.Bermann et al., European Community Law 995-1 022 ( 1 993)
(explaining the procedure of the EC anti-dumping proceeding).
26
European Update, EC Institutions and Procedures 8 (1995). Since each of the five large
states : Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have two Commissioners,
there is unbalance between the Member States and the Commissioners. The Commission
is divided into 23 Directorates General, which are further subdivided into sub-
directorates. Each Commissioner supervises one or two Directorates General. However,
their decisions are taken collectively on behalf of the Commission.
7the Community interest calls for intervention, a definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed
by the Council, acting by simple majority on a proposal submitted by the Commission
after consultation with the Advisory Committee27 .
Finally, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance provides the
opportunities for judicial review of anti-dumping cases and protects procedural rights
under Community law. The Court of Justice used to have the primary jurisdiction over
anti-dumping cases28 . However, since 1 March 1994, the jurisdiction over the anti-
dumping cases has been transferred to the Court of First Instance29 .
A. SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE NEW REGULATION: DETERMINATION
OF DUMPING AND INJURY
1. FIVE PERCENT TEST
The new Regulation codifies a test for market viability in the determination of
normal value. It provides that if volume of sales of the like product destined for domestic
consumption constitutes 5% or more of the sales volume of the product under
27
New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 9 (4); see also Bermann et al., supra note 25, at 52-
53 (explaining the Council's voting system); see also European Update, supra note 26, at
12 (providing updated information about the Council's voting system).
2&See Bermann et al., supra note 25, at 1022.
29
See id. at 72 ("[A]rticle 168a, introduced by the SEA, authorized the Council by
unanimous vote to establish a new Court of First Instance. The SEA left the Council to
fix the jurisdiction over the new court . . . ."); see also European Update, supra note 26,
at 16 ("After a series of long debates, the transfer ofjurisdiction on anti-dumping and
anti-subsidy cases to the Court of First Instance was agreed as from 1 March 1994.").
8consideration to the Community, such sales shall be used to determine normal value 30 .
Even though this provision is introduced for the first time in the new Regulation, it is an
existing practice and has been applied by the Commission since 1984 31 .
In imposing a provisional duty on imports of the electronic typewriters originating
in Japan, the EC Commission introduced the five percent test to EC anti-dumping
proceedings for the first time32 . In this case, the exporters concerned objected to the
Commission's use of domestic prices for the establishment of normal values on the
ground that the volume of sales on the Japanese market was too small and it did not
reach the level of 5% of exports to non-EEC countries that would have been used as a
criterion by the American administration in similar circumstances33 . The Commission
accepted the exporters' complaint. The Commission admitted that the prices on the
domestic market in the country of exportation were, as a rule, the first prior basis for the
determination of normal value under GATT and the Community legislation. However,
since the legislation of other trading partners and the Community's past practice showed
that where the volume of sales on the domestic market is relatively small, account must
be taken of the fact that the prices of such sales may be influenced by other than normal
30
New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (2); see also URAA supra note 20, n. 2, The
URAA provides that:
Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market
of the exporting country shall normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the
determination of the normal value if such sales constitute 5 percent or more of the
sales of the product under consideration to the importing Member, provided that a
lower ratio should be acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic
sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude to provide for a
proper comparison.
ilSee Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 8, at 36.
"Electronic Typewriters (Japan) 1984 O.J. (L335) 43
33M
9commercial considerations and that their quantities might so residual or so negligible that
they could not be considered as reliably reflecting prices in the ordinary course of trade
34
.
Upon this reasoning, the Commission established the normal value on the basis of the
constructed value for the two exporters whose volume of the sales of individual models
on the domestic market was equal to or less than 5% of the volume of exports to the
Community35 . Before Electronic Typewriters, the Commission had used various terms to
describe the special circumstance which did not permit proper comparison36 . In the matter
of legal certainty in determining market viability, adoption of the five percent rule was a
turning point in anti-dumping proceedings in the Community. Since then, the five percent
test had been applied systematically without any deep argument about the legality of the
five percent test
37
. However, this five percent test was challenged in front of the Court of
Justice by a Korean exporter in a later case38 . In this case, Goldstar, Korean exporter of
34
Id.
' 5Id
36
See Creally, supra note 6, at 51 (Potato Granules (Canada) 1981 O.J. (LI 16) 1 1 (minimal
quantities were involved), Ferrochromium (South Africa, Surinam, Turkey, Zimbabwe)
1983 O.J. (LI 61) 15 (quantities involved were insufficient), Unwrought Aluminum
(Norway, USSR, Yugoslavia, Surinam) 1984 O.J. (L57) 19 (small quantities were
involved), Ballbearings (miniature) (Singapore, Japan) 1984 O.J. (L79) 8 (virtually no
sale)).
37
Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven in Goldstar Co Ltd. v Council of the
European Community, Reports of Cases (1992), 677; See also Creally, supra note 6 at
51; Electronic Typewriters (Japan) 1984 O.J. (L335) 43; Photocopiers (Japan) 1986 O.J.
(L239) 5; Dot Matrix Printers (Japan) 1988 O.J. (LI 30) 12; Video Cassette Tapes (Hong
Kong, South Korea) 1989 O.J. (L174) 1; Compact Disk Players (Japan, South Korea)
1989 O.J. (L205) 5; Ferro Silicon (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Benezuela, Yugoslavia)
1990 O.J. (L38) 1; Ballbearings (Thailand) 1990 O.J. (LI 52) 24; Small Screen Colour
TV Receivers (Hong Kong, China) 1991 O.J. (LI 4) 31.
38Case C- 105/90, Goldstar Co. Ltd. v. Council, 1992 E.C.R. 677.
10
compact disk players, argued that even though the volume of domestic sales was greater
than 5% of the volume of exports to the Community, it did not necessarily mean that
domestic prices permit a proper comparison39 . It asked for a special treatment, exemption
from the test, by saying that the Commission assessed the volume of its domestic sales
only in relative terms, applying the so-called "5% rule," which was expressed by the
volume of sales on the domestic market as a percentage of exports to the Community and
that the Commission failed to take into consideration the characteristics and size of the
Korean market for compact disk players, which during the reference period amounted
only to sales of 5,000 units. The Court of Justice did not reject the basic concept of the
argument that the five percent rule is not an absolute borderline in market viability40 . The
Court of Justice, however, held that 5,000 units represented a considerable percentage of
exports of Korean compact disc players to the Community during the reference period,
namely 14%, and that the domestic sales by Goldstar were sufficient to permit a normal
pattern of price formation on the Korean market. Consequently, it was unnecessary to
depart from the 5% practice41 . Similar disputes were raised in Brother42 . In this case, the
applicants also argued that domestic sales of the products concerned were too small to be
used as a basis for establishing normal values43 . The Court of Justice rejected their
arguments, not because the argument was wrong, but because there was no factual basis
supporting their argument44 . Under the new Regulation, those arguments will no longer
wSee id.
40See id.
41See id.
42Case 250/85, Brother Industries Ltd. v Council 1988 E.C.R. 5683.
43Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven, supra note 37.
"Id.
11
be raised because it gives the statutory guideline in determining market viability.
However, it should be noted that there is a slight difference between the wording in
Electronic Typewriters and in the new Regulation. In the first case, the Commission used
the phrase "equal to or less than 5%," which meant that the exact 5% of domestic sales of
the volume of exports to the Community did not permit a proper comparison. However,
the new Regulation is using a different term, namely "5% or more." Consequently, the
new Regulation could find an opposite result in the same situation. In addition, the new
Regulation provides that if the prices are considered representative for the market
concerned, those sales may be used as a basis for the determination of normal value
regardless of the five percent requirement45 . The Court of Justice already expressed the
same view in Noelle case46 . The Court of Justice deduced the 5% rule to determine
whether an alleged third country market economy had a representative market or not. The
Court of Justice rejected the allegation by saying that although less than 5% of the
volume of exports to the community does not necessarily mean that the choice of a
reference country could not be regarded as appropriate and reasonable, a figure of 1 .25%
did not reflect a representative market47 . This reasoning of the Court of Justice in Noelle
is the same as the new provision in that the representativeness could negate applicability
of the 5% test. Generally speaking, even though there is room for the Community
authorities' discretions to be involved, especially in determining the representativeness of
a market which accounts for less than 5% of domestic sales, this provision will improve
the legal certainty in anti-dumping proceedings in the Community. As a result, the
45New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (2).
46Case C- 16/90, Noelle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, 1991 E.C.R. 5163.
A1
Id.
12
method used to evaluate the representativeness of sales in domestic markets is likely to be
a main concern in the market viability area.
2. SALES BELOW COST AND CONSTRUCTED VALUE
The URAA provides that sales below cost may be disregarded in the calculation
of normal value only if such sales are at prices that do not permit cost recovery within a
reasonable period of time48 . And also, the URAA sets certain conditions clarifying the
general rule. Article 2 (4) of the new Regulation incorporates those changes in the
URAA49 . Under Article 2 (4), the Commission is required to meet three requirements to
disregard below cost sales in determining normal value.
First, the below-cost sales should be made within an extended period of time.
Article 2 (4) (b) clarifies that the extended period of time should normally be one year but
shall in no case be less than six months. In other words, if some below cost sales in a
domestic market have been made less than six months, the Commission could not
disregard the below cost sales under the new Regulation. There were similar provisions in
Regulation 2176/84 and 2423/88 50 .
Second, the below cost sales should be made in substantial quantities. Where the
volume of sales below unit cost is not less than 20% or more, the substantial quantity test
is considered to be met51 . Thus, if more than 80% of total volume of domestic sales were
made at a profitable level, normal value would be calculated as the weighted average
4SSee URAA, supra note 20, art. 2.2.1.
49New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (2).
50
Id. Contrary to the new Regulation, Regulation 2423/88 did not mention about a time
period regarding the below-cost sales.
5
'New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (4)(b).
13
sales prices of all transactions including below cost sales. Recently, the Commission
applied the 20/80 test in Microwave Ovens52 . In that case, the Commission held that
average domestic sales prices should be used to determine normal value where all or
more 80% of total sales was made at a profitable level. And, if those profitable sales
amounted from 20% to 80%, normal value should be established as an average of
remaining profitable sales. However, if less than 20% of domestic sales were made at a
profitable level, all transactions would be disregarded. This reasoning seems clear enough
to substantially reduce the controversy over disregarding below-cost sales in the
determination of normal value. The substantial quantity test is also considered to be met
where the weighted average selling price is below the weighted average unit cost53 . Thus,
temporary below-cost sales will be considered to be in the ordinary course of trade and
therefore, will not be disregarded in the determination of normal value. The substantial
quantity test will give more flexibility in domestic price policy to manufacturers who sell
in both domestic and foreign markets because temporary below cost sales will be
regarded as being in the ordinary course of trade.
Finally, the last condition to exclude below cost sales in determining normal value
is that domestic sales are made at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs
within a reasonable period of time54 . Article 2 (4) (a) of the new Regulation incorporates
the safe harbor clause of the URAA 55 . This safe harbor clause also will provide some
52
Microwave Ovens ( the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Thailand,
Malaysia) 1995 O.J. (LI 56) 5.
"New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (4)(b).
54
Id. art. 2 (4)(a).
55
see generally Alan F. Holmer et al., Enactment and Rejected Amendments to the Anti-
dumping Law: In Implementation or Contravention ofthe Anti-dumping Agreement?, 29
14
degree of elasticity in price policy especially for those business sectors which are
suffering from severe fluctuations in raw material markets. But for this provision,
manufacturers should adjust prices of their products whenever those prices fall under
unstable production costs occurred by the fluctuation in the raw material markets.
Furthermore, Article 2 (5) provides that cost shall normally be calculated on the
basis of the records kept by the party under investigation, provided that such records are
in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the country concerned
and it is shown that the records reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production
and sale of the product under consideration56 . These changes for the definition of costs
will allow the Community authorities less discretion than in the past57 .
3. START-UP COST
(a) Result of the URAA
The URAA provides that sales below cost calculations will be adjusted for
circumstances in which costs are affected by start-up operations58 . The premise of this
provision is that costs incurred at the initial stages of an industry's production easily
Int'l Law. 502 (1995) ("In the URAA, it establishes a safe harbor, instead of a fixing
term, by which prices that are below cost at the time of sale but above weighted average
cost for the period of investigation will automatically be considered to provide for the
recovery of costs within a reasonable time").
56New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (5).
57
Edwin A. Verlmust & Paul Waer, The Post Uruguay Round EC Anti-Dumping
Regulation: After a Pit Stop, Back in the Race, Journal of World Trade (Law-
Economics-Public policy), April 1995, at 56.
58
see Holmer et al., supra note 55 at 484; see also URAA, supra note 20, art. 2.2.1.1
("[C]osts shall be adjusted appropriately .... for circumstances in which costs during
the period of investigation are affected by start-up operations.").
15
create the appearance of below-cost pricing59 . An adjustment for such costs could be
significant in cases involving high-technology products, which typically have high start-
up costs and short life cycles60 . The URAA further provides that, for start-up operations,
an adjustment to costs shall be made to reflect the costs at the end of the start-up period
,
or if that period extends beyond the period of investigation, the most recent costs which
can reasonably be taken into account by the authorities during the investigation61 .
However, the URAA does not provide a definition of what constitutes the end of a start-
up process. Thus, it is not clear how broadly or narrowly the concept of start-up should be
viewed to distinguish between annual model changes and a new product as well as
specific costs to be adjusted62 . Since the URAA does not specify a detailed method of the
approach to the provision, the choices ofhow the issues should be addressed is left to the
individual governments as long as they comply with the URAA63 .
(b) Implementation of the URAA
The new Regulation incorporates the provision of the URAA requiring the
authorities to make a special cost adjustment for start-up operations when it calculates
costs of production for purposes of determining whether domestic sales are below cost or
establishing a constructed normal value64 . It provides that:
59
see Holmer et al.,supra note 55 at 484.
60Id
61URAA, supra note 20, n. 6.
62
Id.
"id. At 487.
64
Ivo Van Bael, The 1 994 Anti-dumping Code And The New EC Anti-dumping Regulation
239(1995).
16
Where the costs for part of the period for cost recovery are affected by the
use of new production facilities requiring substantial additional investment and by
low capacity utilization rates, which are the result of start-up operations which
take place within or during part of the investigation period, the average costs for
the start-up phase shall be those applicable under the above-mentioned allocation
rules, at the end of such a phase, and shall be included at that level, for the period
concerned, in the weighted-average cost referred to in paragraph 4(a). The length
of the start-up period shall be determined in relation to the circumstances of the
producer or exporter concerned, but shall not exceed an appropriate initial portion
of the period for cost recovery. For this adjustment to costs applicable during the
investigation period, information relating to a start-up phase which extends
beyond that period shall be taken into account in so far as it is submitted prior to
verification visits and within three months from the initiation of the
investigation65 .
This is a subordinate provision of Article 2 (5). Article 2(5) already provides that
the calculation of costs shall be based on the generally accepted accounting principles,
which would allocate, if any, general start-up costs over a reasonable number of years66 .
Thus, the focus of Article 2 (5) (b) seems to deal with matters not covered by the general
cost allocation rules, such as low production volume in a start-up phase67 .
Another source of potent controversy is that the provision is ambiguous, like the
URAA, as to the length of the start-up period. However, the Explanatory Memorandum
does address this problem. It notes that a fixed term of the start-up period would be more
65New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (5)(b).
66
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on Protection against Dumped Imports from
Countries not members of the European Community, 30 September 1994, Explanatory
Memorandum, at 3 [Hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum].
h7
Id.
17
controversial and might not account for differences between products and industries68 . It
seems desirable not to define specific terms because it is crucial to take into account
characteristics of a specific product or industry in determining a start-up period. However,
the period should not be limited by the safe harbor period in the URAA, because the
URAA does not clearly permit national authorities to require cost recovery within one
year
69
. Once again, the Community authorities' discretion will be a key factor in the
determination of the start-up period.
Finally, the three-month time limit of the last sentence in Article 2 (5) (b) is
viewed as an effort to meet the strict time limits for the completion of anti-dumping
investigations under which provisional duties should be imposed within 9 months after
the initiation of the investigation70 .
The start-up questions have not been raised frequently in the past anti-dumping
proceedings. In those cases, the start-up disputes were not related to the cost adjustment
dealt with in Article 2 (5) (b) of the New Regulation71 . Recently, in Color Television
Receivers 72
,
a Thai producer claimed that its production plant was in a start-up situation
6i
Id. The Explanatory Memorandum provides that;
[I]t is a lot more difficult to define the length of a start-up period.
Consideration has been given to specifying a normal sales quantity or setting a
precise duration for the length of a start-up phase, e.g. 6 months. Such specific
definitions would, however, be controversial and could take no account of
differences between products and industries.
69Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 58.
10See Van Bael, supra note 64, at 240.
71
See Aspartame (Japan, the United States of America) 1990 O.J. (L330) 16. An exporter
argued that the Community Industry was injured by the start-up phase; see also Plain
Paper Photocopiers (Japan) 1986 O.J. (L239) 5.
72
Color Television Receivers (Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of
18
during the investigation period. Therefore, the cost of production during that period
could not possibly be in the ordinary course of trade. The Commission rejected the
argument by saying that the relatively higher costs during the investigation period,
compared to other periods, was the result of lower capacity utilization, which are not
related to a start-up situation. One notable point is that the producer's argument was
based on the test of an ordinary course of trade because of the absence of a start-up
provision. However, under the new Regulation, the request for the start-up adjustment
will directly refer to Article 2(5) (b) and the result in Color Television Receiver would be
different under the new Regulation which recognizes that low capacity utilization may be
sufficient evidence to merit a start-up adjustment. At any rate, claims for the adjustment
will be increased and disputed more frequently in the future proceedings. Since relatively
increased discretion is left to the Community authorities in the start-up area, the
authorities' fair application is a crucial factor and they must build a consistent practice in
near future.
:
4. SGA AND PROFIT IN CONSTRUCTIVE NORMAL VALUE
Where the domestic market prices do not permit proper comparisons, the
Commission has two alternative methods for determining normal value. Article 2 (3) of
the new Regulation provides that if there are no or insufficient sales of a like product in
the ordinary course of trade, or if a particular market situation affects the domestic market
prices to the degree that those sales do not permit a proper comparison, the Commission
can determine normal value on the basis of either constructed value or export prices to an
appropriate third country73 . The Commission has had wide discretion in selecting a
Korea, Singapore and Thailand) 1994 O.J. (L225) 50.
73New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (3).
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proper method between the abovementioned alternatives 74 . In practice, the Commission
has preferred the constructed value to the third-country export price. The Commission's
reasoning was based on the possibility that export sales to another country could have
been at dumped prices; however, constructed value offered more reasonable grounds for
the determination of normal value75 .
Constructed value consists of costs for production in the country of origin,
reasonable amounts of selling, general and administrative costs (hereinafter SGA), and
profit. The cost of production can be divided into the following sub-categories: costs of
materials, costs of direct labor, manufacturing overheads, financing costs, and packing
costs
76
. The material costs cover all the expenses of parts and components incorporated in
the product concerned. It also includes all the material costs associated with the
manufacture of a component that have been incurred in a period77 . Direct labor costs
include all labor costs that can be identified with a particular product or process78 . They
are composed of pay, employee benefits and other employee-related expenses79 .
14See Creally, supra note 6, at 84,88, and 94.
75
See Creally, supra note 6, at 53; See also, Ballbearings (miniature) (Japan, Singapore)
1980 O.J. (L79) 8 (The Minebea Group requested that normal value be constructed on
the basis of the prices at which its products exported from Singapore are first resold to an
independent buyer on the Japanese market. The EC Commission held that with regard to
those exports it could not be ruled out that dumping was being practiced by Minebea on
the Japanese market.).
16See Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 8, at 37.
11
Id. at 38.
n
Id.
79
Id. The term 'pay' covers basic pay, overtime pay, incentive pay, bonuses and shift
differentials, and 'employee benefits' indicates housing, holiday pay, retirement, social
security programs and so on.
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Manufacturing overhead concerns all expenses incidental to and necessary for the
product80 . And, when a particular loan is related to the manufacture of the product
concerned, the interest of the loan is included as a financing cost. After the calculation of
the costs of production, the next step is the calculation of SGA expenses and profit.
Under Regulation 2423/88, Article 2(3)(b)(ii) provided several ways to determine
the SGA expenses and profit. The first priority was that the SGA expenses and profit
could be calculated by reference to the expenses incurred and the profit realized by the
producer or exporter on the profitable sales of the like product in the domestic market. If
such data was unavailable or unreliable or was not suitable for use, the next method of
determination for SGA and profit was to refer to the expenses incurred by other producers
or exporters on the country of origin or export on their profitable sales of the like
product81 . And, if neither of the two methods had not been available, the SGA expenses
incurred could be calculated by reference to the sales made by the exporter or other
producers or exporters in the same business sector in the country of origin or export or on
any other reasonable basis. The major controversy concerning the determination of SGA
and profit was that the Commission's practice, using only profitable domestic sales,
might not reflect the true expense and profit82 .
80
Id.The manufacturing overheads include following items, indirect labor, supervision,
depreciation, rent, power, maintenance and repairs, and accounting adjustments to
inventory.
81 Council Regulation (EEC) 2423/88, supra note 15, art. 2 (3)(b)(ii).
82
See Creally, supra note 6, at 56; see generally Paul Waer, Constructed Normal Values in
EC Dumping Margin Calculations : Friction, or a Realistic Approach?, Journal of
World Trade (Law-Economics-Public Policy), Journal of World Trade (Law-Economics-
Public policy), August 1993, 47-80 (providing specific numerical examples of
calculation of SGA and profit in constructed normal value).
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The URAA now provides international standards in the calculation of SGA and
profit
83
. This seems to be an effort to reduce the gaps among the different practices
adopted by each country. Article 2.2.2 of the URAA requires national authorities to base
SGA expenses and profit on actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary
course of trade of the like product by exporter or producer under investigation. Article 2
(6) of the new Regulation closely follows the URAA provisions. It does not give a strict
order of precedence for the use of other producers' or exporters' SGA and profit for the
like product over the SGA and profit in the same general category of products of the
producer concerned84 . These options are merely listed as alternatives85 . Article 2 (6) also
provides that, in conformity with the URAA, the SGA and profit should be based on the
domestic market of the country of origin86 . It is different from Regulation 2423/88, which
referred to the expenses and profits incurred in the country of origin or export87 . The
distinction between the country of origin and the country of export is important, since
those countries are not identical in an increasing number of cases88 . However, there is a
significant difference between the new Regulation and the URAA. The new Regulation
tacks on the phrase "in the ordinary course of trade" in Article 2 (6) (ii)
89
. This limitation
83URAA, supra note 20, art. 2.2.2.
84Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at58.
85
Edwin A. Verlmust & Paul Waer, EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the
Uruguay Round-A New Lease ofLife?, Journal of World Trade (Law-Economics-Public
policy), April 1994, at 12.
86New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (6) (I) (ii) (iii).
87Vulmust and Waer, supra note 85, at 12.
"Id.
89
Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at58. The limitation has not been applied consistently
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does not appear in the URAA. The restriction is viewed as the Commission's effort to
justify the calculation of the profit margin on profitable sales only90 . In the past, the
Commission disregarded all non-profitable sales in calculating profit margin and
Regulation 2423/88 provided that SGA expenses and profit should be based on the
profitable sales in the domestic market. This change will result in different determinations
of profit in connection with Article 2(4) of the new Regulation. Under the new
Regulation, the Commission is not allowed to disregard all non-profitable sales in the
domestic market because Article 2(4) of the new Regulation provides the scope of the
ordinary course of trade. According to Article 2(4), below-cost sales in the domestic
market may be treated as not part of the ordinary course of trade only if such sales are
made within an extended period of time in substantial qualities and at prices which do not
provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable time period 9I . Therefore, the
Commission should meet those conditions to disregard non-profitable sales in the
determination of profit margins.
5. DETERMINATION OF DUMPING MARGIN
The calculation of a dumping margin is the final step in the determination of
dumping92 . At a glance, since a dumping margin means the amount by which the normal
value exceeds the export price, calculation of dumping margins look simple, namely,
subtracting export price from the normal value93 . But the calculation has not been
as it does not show up in Article 2 (6) (I) and (iii).
90
Id.
91New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (4); see also supra pp. 12-13.
92See Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 8, at 64.
9iSee Id.
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clarified. In practice, the methods used for determining dumping margins have been one
of the most controversial issues in the EC's anti-dumping proceedings, especially after
Ballbearings I94 and n95 . During the middle of 1980s, the Commission's methodology
for determination of the dumping margin began to change. The outcome of the change
was delivered by the Council concerning Ballbearings from Japan and Singapore96 . Even
though, during the same period the Anti-dumping Regulation 3017/7997 was amended98
,
since both Regulations 3017/79 and 2176/84 had the same provisions regarding the
determination of dumping margin under the Article 2(13), the changed provision could
not be a solution to the controversy over the Commission's methodology of determining
of the dumping margin. The Article 2(13) of 2176/84 merely enumerated four bases
which could be used for calculation of dumping margins where prices are varied99 . They
94
See James K. Lockett, EEC Anti-dumping Law and Trade Policy After Ballbearings II
:
Discretionary Decisions Masquerading As Legal Progress, 8 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 365,
n. 12. Ballbearings I is the commonly-known name of following five decisions of the
European Court of Justice. They are NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council, Import Standard
Office v. Council, Nippon Seiko K.K. v. Council, Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council and Nachi
Fujikoshi Corp. v. Council.
95
See id. nn, 12,17 & 78. Ballbearing II is the well known term indicating five Anti-
dumping cases appealed to the Court of Justice after a decision of affirmative dumping
by the Council. Four of the five appeals were by the same Japanese companies party to
Ballbearings I which consists ofNTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council, Import Standard
Office v. Council, Nippon Seilo L.L. v. Council, Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council and Nachi
Fujiloshi Corp. v. Council. The Ballbearings II cases are NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v.
Council, Nachi Fujiloshi Corp. v. Council, Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council, Nippon Seilo
L.L. v. Council and Minebea Co. v. Council.
96
Ballbearings (miniature) (Japan, Singapore), 1984 O.J. (L193) 1.
97Council Regulation 3017/79, supra note 10.
98Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note 12.
99
New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2 (13)(a). Of course, where prices did not vary, the
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were the transaction-by-transaction basis, the most frequent price basis, the representative
price basis and the weighted average price basis. The dumping margin could be calculated
on one of the said bases 100 . It should be noted that it was the Community authorities' view
that the use of one base in a given case did not prevent them from using a different
method in a new proceeding even when it involves the same product 101 . The selection of a
method in the calculation of dumping margin was a discretionary matter left to the
Community authorities.
(a) Origin of Controversy102
In Ballbearings I, the Court of Justice ruled in favor of the applicants and annulled
the Regulation imposing definitive Anti-dumping duties on certain companies. After the
Court of Justice's decision, the Federation of European Bearing Manufacturers
Association lodged a new complaint alleging dumping and injury by the Japanese
producers. In this Anti-dumping procedure, the Commission and the Japanese companies
agreed to settle the investigation by accepting the undertakings. In March 1983, the
European ballbearing industry argued that despite the undertakings, dumping and injury
calculation of dumping margin a simple substraction of export price from normal value.
100New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2(13) (b).
101
See Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 8, at 65. The Council's reasoning about using the
different method in calculation of the dumping margin from Ballbearings I was that:
It is correct that in former ball bearings proceedings, the application of the
transaction by transaction method was to be neither feasible for foreign exporters
nor for the Commission services because of the numerous individual sales
transactions involved. However, experience has shown in the meantime that, in
view of, inter alia, the technological progress made in office equipment and
systems, this method is feasible.
102See generally Lockett, supra note 94.
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were still occurring to the Community industry. Upon the allegations in the complaint, the
Commission initiated an investigation concerning imports of certain ballbearings
originating in Japan and Singapore. After a provisional decision, the Commission
imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty and revoked the undertakings. A counteraction
by the exporters involved another offer for new undertakings, which were rejected by the
Commission. Following the provisional duty by the Commission, the Council confirmed
the Commission's findings and imposed definitive Anti-dumping duties. In October and
November 1984, the Japanese companies filed applications to annul the Council
Regulation imposing definitive duties, known as Ballbearings JX In the contested
Regulation 103 , normal values and export prices were calculated on different bases. While
the normal values were determined on the weighted average basis, the export prices were
on the transaction-by-transaction basis. After making the necessary deductions to bring
them to ex-factory prices, the Commission artificially reduced export prices that were
above their comparable normal values to the level of the normal values. Then, it
determined the dumping margins by comparing the weighted average normal values and
individual export prices in which some had already been reduced. In other words, the
amounts exceeding the normal values were not taken into account in determining the
dumping margins. The drawback of this method for the exporters was that it tended to
inflate the dumping margins because the Commission did not give any credit for export
sales made at prices in excess of normal value 104 . The Commission's justification was
that since the Anti-dumping Regulation stipulated that the dumping margin was the
amount by which the normal value exceeded the export price, the concept of a negative
""Ballbearings (miniature), supra note 96.
]04See Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 8, at 66.
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dumping margin should be excluded from the scope of the dumping margin 105 . By the
same reason, the comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average
export price containing both dumped and non-dumped sales was against the community's
Anti-dumping Legislation 106 . Several applicants in Ballbearings II argued that the
unprecedented methodology used by the Community authorities was against the
principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation and breached the rules of sound
administration 107 .
The Court of Justice rejected all of the allegations. First, with regard to the
principle of legal certainty, the Court of Justice decided that since this case was a review
proceeding under Article 14 of the Regulation 3017/79, which allowed the earlier
measures to be amended, repealed, or annulled, the principle of legal certainty did not
prevent the re-examination 108 . Regarding the principle of legitimate expectation, the Court
of Justice said that the institutions had a margin of discretion and thus the use of the same
method was not a legitimate expectation. Finally, the Court of Justice stated that "the
rules of sound administration cannot prevent the institutions from using the powers
conferred upon them by the regulations in force". The institutions' methodology was
approved by the Court of Justice through Ballbearings II. Since Ballbearings II, the use of
inconsistent methodologies to the determination of dumping margins has been a
consistent practice in the EC anti-dumping proceedings 109 .
" 5Seeid. at 67, n. 14.
™See id.
]01See Lockett, supra note 94, at 389.
mSee id.
mSee Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 8, at 66-67.
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(b) Fair Comparison Requirement in the URAA and the New EC Regulation.
Major exporting countries have been complaining of the practice by the
Community authorities for a long time. During the Uruguay Round Anti-dumping
negotiations, one of the major negotiating objectives of many countries was to include an
explicit requirement that there be a fair comparison between the export price and the
normal value in determining whether dumping has occurred. Indeed, one of the major
accomplishments of the negotiations is the preeminence of the explicit fair comparison
requirement in Article 2.4 of the new Code 1 10 . Since the prior Anti-dumping Codes did
not provide the specific standard for comparing export prices to import prices, each
country has adopted its own rule arbitrarily, which usually increased dumping margins or
even created dumping margins that would not have existed in a reasonable comparison.
For example, as already mentioned in Ballbearings II, even though a product has exactly
the same price fluctuation both in domestic and foreign markets, the product could be
considered as being dumped under the old practice, which allowed authorities to compare
each transaction price in its own market to the weighted average home market price in
the exporting country 111 . To provide a universal guideline, the new Code states that the
existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be
established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of
U0See Holmer, supra note 55, at 497.
in
See Ballbearings, supra note 96. The EC Commission held that a comparison of normal
value with a weighted average export price comprising dumped and non-dumped sales
would be in contradiction with the EC Council's amendment of the Community's Anti-
dumping legislation. Therefore it has been a consistent practice of the EC Commission
not to use weighted average export prices for the determination of the dumping margin
except in cases where for administrative reasons it was not considered feasible to employ
the transaction-by-transaction method or where the averaging of the export prices would
have had no effect on the overall outcome of the proceedings.
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normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis 112 . This new
provision, however, does not eliminate all chances of applying the old practice. If the
authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different
purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such
differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted average-
to-weighted or transaction-to transaction comparison, the old practice is still applicable 113 .
The new EC Regulation reproduced the URAA provisions. Here, it is recommended to
think about the economic structure of the Member States to find out how the exception to
the general rule in Article 2(11) of the new Regulation will affect the Community
authorities' application of the Article. In the EC, it is common knowledge that there are
significant price differences in many sectors depending on the Member State. Therefore,
it would be very difficult for exporters to maintain a consistent price pattern for all the
Member States under those economic situations.
If foreign producers adapt their prices to different levels prevailing in each
Member State, the Community authorities could easily invoke the exception because the
fact that the price pattern significantly differs among the Member States meets the
requirement for application of the exception under Article 2(11).
6. DE MINIMIS DUMPING MARGIN
Article 5.8 of the URAA provides that there shall be immediate termination in
cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis" 4 . The de
minimis is defined as a dumping margin less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage
112URAA, supra note 20, art. 2.4.2.
m
Id.
114URAA, supra note 20, art. 5.8.
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of the export price" 5 . The new Regulation incorporates the de minimis rule in Article 9
(3). The export price in the provision should be understood as the CIF value since that is
the EC's usual base for customs valuation" 6 . Compared to the past practice, the 2 per
cent de minimis rule is a slightly higher standard. In the past, duties of less than 2 per
cent have been occasionally imposed 1 ' 7 . However, in most cases' 18 , dumping margins of
1 per cent or less were considered as minimal and not injurious to the Community
producers. At any rate, imposition of duties of less than 2 per cent will be disregarded in
the EC anti-dumping proceedings as a result of the new de minimis rule.
Article 9 (3) of the new Regulation further provides that such exporters whose
dumping margins are below 2 % shall remain subject to the proceeding and may be
reinvestigated in any subsequent country-wide reviews" 9 . This provision is inconsistent
U5
Id.
116
See Vulmust and Waer, supra note 85, at 14 footnote 32. The URAA does not specify
what exactly is to be understood by the export price. It can be assumed that this leaves
authorities some leeway in calculating the margin in relation to their usual base for
customs valuation.
117
See id; See also Video Cassettes (the Republic of Korea) 1989 O.J. (LI 74) 1 (the
Council imposed anti-dumping duties of 2.0 % and 1.9 % to Korean producers).
118
See Creally, supra note 6, at 72; see also Non-alloyed Unwrought Aluminum (Egypt)
1983 O.J. (LI 61) 13 (a dumping margin of 0.3 % was considered de minimis);
Sensitized Paper for Color Photographs (Japan) 1984 O.J. (LI 24) 45 (a dumping margin
of 0.54 % was considered de minimis); Ceramic Tiles (Spain) 1984 O.J. (LI 68) 35 (a
dumping margin of less than 0.5 % was considered de minimis); Denim (Turkey,
Indonesia, Hong Kong, Macao) 1990 O.J. (L222) 50 (dumping margin was less than
1%); Polyester Yarns (Mexico) 1991 O.J. (L275) 21 (a dumping margin of 0.53 % was
considered de minimis); Polyester Yarns (Taiwan, Indonesia, India, China, Turkey) 1991
O.J. (L276) 7(dumping margins of 0.43 % and 0.26 % were considered de minimis).
119
New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 9 (3); see also Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at
62.
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with Rima judgment 120 . In Rima, the Court of Justice held that a producer which obtained
a zero margin in the original investigation could not be included in the review 121 . Thus,
even though a initial investigation to an exporter has been terminated due to a dumping
margin below the de minimis percentage, the exporter is still subject to the review
procedure under Article 1 1 of the new Regulation.
Article 9 (3) also requires an immediate termination of investigation in a case
where the dumping margin is de minimis. Therefore, the Commission should terminate
the investigation as soon as it examines the questionnaire response and finds that there is
a dumping margin of less than 2 % 122 . However, the Commission's practice delays the
termination by insisting on verifying the reposes on the spot and double-checking the
calculation 123 . Since the delay of the termination would retard business activities for the
exporters concerned in the Community market, the Commission must devote its attention
to the prompt termination of investigation in future anti-dumping proceedings.
7.DETERMTNATION OF INJURY
The most controversial issue in this area is the cumulation of injury in assessing
the volume of imports. Article 3.3 of the URAA provides three requirements for
cumulative assessment of injury. The first requirement is that the margin of dumping
120Case 216/92, Rima Eletrometalurgia Sa. v. Council, 1993 E.C.R. 6303.
n]See id. The Court of Justice stated that
:
Whilst dictates of equal treatment might justify extending the review to
producers and exporters who were affected by the anti-dumping duty and who had
not requested that review, they could not justify the opening of a new
investigation into the case of the applicant, whose products had, following the
initial investigation, been excluded form application of the anti-dumping duty.
mSee Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 62.
mSee id.
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established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis and the
volume of import from each country is not negligible 124 . As we have seen in the previous
chapter, the de minimis dumping margin is one of less than 2 % 125 . The negligible volume
of import has a more complicated definition and there is disparity between the URAA
and the EC new Regulation. And the second is a cumulative assessment of the effects of
the imports appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between imported
products and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like
domestic product 126 . Finally, we can draw the last requirement from the first sentence of
Article 3.3 of the URAA. The imports of a product from more than one country are
simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations 127. Once the three requirements are
met, national authorities can cumulatively assess the effects of imports 128 . Article 3 (4) of
the new Regulation reproduced Article 3.3 of the URAA 129 .
(a) Negligible Imports
Article 5.8 of the URAA provides that there shall be immediate termination where
it is determined that the volume of the dumped imports is negligible 130 . According to the
provision, the volume of imports is negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a
124URAA, supra note 20, art. 3.3.
125
See supra pp. 27-28. Article 5.8 of the URAA also provides the same figure as the de
minimis dumping margin.
126URAA, supra note 20, art. 3.3.
ni
Id.
m
Id.
129New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 3 (4).
130 URAA, supra note 20, art 5.8.
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particular country is found to account for less than 3 % of imports of the like product in
the importing country unless countries which individually account for less than 3 % of the
imports of the like product in the importing country collectively account for more than 7
% of imports of the like product in the importing country 131 . This is quite a different
definition from the Dunkel Draft, which defined the volume of the negligible imports as a
1
-percent market share in the importing country or a collective market share of 2.5
percent 132 .
The new Regulation follows the test based on market share, but sets out somewhat
different numbers. Article 5 (7) of the Regulation provides that proceedings shall not be
against countries whose imports represent a market-share of below 1 percent, unless such
countries collectively account for 3 %or more of Community consumption 133 . We can
expect that the 1 percent test based on the market share is more liberal than 3 percent test
based on import volume in the URAA until the total imports reach more than a third of
total market share in the importing country134 . Thus, the market share test looks more
reasonable because in certain situations, minute market shares could reach 3 percent of
total imports.
However, the new provision contains a couple of flaws. It may be more
burdensome to administer because it could be more difficult to obtain data concerning
market share which are typically in the hands of the EC industry 135 . And the other
ux
Id.
132Vulmust and Waer, supra note 85, at 15.
133New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 5 (7).
134
Id.
135
See Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 63. Since the Eurostat statistics provides
import data, it is relatively easy to access.
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problem is the conflict against the URAA provision. Even though it is true that the EC
test is more liberal in most cases, there could be a particular case in which the URAA test
is more advantageous to exporters. In such cases, the 1 percent test based on market share
is viewed as a challengeable violation under the WTO 136 .
(b) Appropriate Circumstance
The second requirement is whether the Community's market situation is
appropriate for the cumulation. In the past, the Commission has frequently used the
method of exporter and exporting-country cumulation in assessing the volume of
imports 137 . However, there was no automatic cumulation. It has been applied on a case by
case basis. In determining cumulatibility, the Commission considered market shares,
recent movement of import volumes, physical characteristics of products and so on 138 .
For example, in Polyester Yarn 139
,
the Commission took the cumulation method after
considering that the volume of imports from all involved countries had been increased
between 1986 and 1987. By contrast, in Synthetic Fibers of Polyester, the Commission
exclude products of the American producers from the assessment of the injury because
mSee id. at 64.
137Vulmust and Waer, supra note 85, at 14.
m
Id.
139
Polyester Yarn 1988 O.J. (LI 51) 39; see also Creally, supra note 6, at 77; Glutamic Acid
and its Salts (Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Republic of Korea) 1990 O.J. (L56) 23;
Methenamine (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) 1 990
O.J. (L104) 14; Photo Albums (Republic of Korea, Hong Kong) 1990 O.J. (L138) 48;
Audio Cassettes in Tapes (Japan, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea) 1990 O.J. (L313) 5;
Small Screen Color TV Receivers (China, Hong Kong) 1991 O.J. (LI 4) 31; Artificial
Corundum (USSR, Poland, China, Hungary, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) 1991
O.J. (L275) 27.
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the volume of exports was relatively small and the quality of the product differed from
the exports of other countries 140 . As a result, when it comes to the second requirement,
the Commission's past practice has been largely consistent with the provision in the new
Regulation.
(c) Requirement of Simultaneous Investigation
On the other hand, the third requirement, the simultaneousness of investigation,
will affect the Commission's past practice more or less. The requirement of
simultaneousness means that if duties have been imposed on a certain product from a
country, and a new proceeding and investigation is started against the same kind of
product from different countries, any alleged injury caused by dumped products from the
latter countries cannot be cumulated with the injury caused by imports from the first
country 141 . In practice, the Commission has occasionally cumulated products which were
subjected to different investigations 142 . Therefore, the past EC practice will no longer be
available under the new Regulation.
B. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW REGULATION
140
Synthetic Fibers of Polyester (Mexico, Romania, Turkey, Taiwan, USA, Yugoslavia)
1988 O.J. (L151) 47; See also Tungsten Carbide (China, Republic of Korea) 1990 O.J.(
L83) 36; Audio Tapes in Cassettes (Japan, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea) 1990 O.J.
(LI 19) 35; Dihydrostreptomycin (Japan, China) 1991 O.J. (L187) 23; Cotton Yarn
(Brazil, Egypt, Turkey, India, Thailand) 1991 O.J. (L271) 17.
141Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 62.
142
Vulmust and Waer, supra note 85, at 15; see also Certain Electronic Weighing Scales
(Singapore, Republic of Korea) 1993 O.J. (LI 12) 20; Certain Electronic Weighing
Scales (Japan) 1993 O.J. (LI 04) 4.
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1 . REIMBURSEMENT OF DUTY
Since the anti-dumping duty is intended to have a compensatory effect, it should
not exceed real dumping margins 143 . Thus, EC anti-dumping regulations have provided a
refund procedure for anti-dumping duties exceeding actual dumping margins. The URAA
provides two important modifications in reimbursement of anti-dumping duties and the
new Regulation reproduces those changes with some deviations.
(a) Deduction of Anti-Dumping Duties as a Cost
The URAA sets out a notable provision with respect to treatment of anti-dumping
duties in reconstructing the export price. It requires the national authorities to take
account of any change in normal value, any change of costs incurred between importation
and re-sale, and any movement in the re-sale price which is duly reflected in subsequent
selling prices, and to calculate the export price with no deduction for the amount of anti-
dumping duties paid when conclusive evidence of the above is provided 144 .
This change seems to be aimed at the EC authorities' practice to deduct anti-
dumping duties as a cost which made it almost impossible for related importers to refund
the overimposed anti-dumping duties. The Court of Justice condoned the Commission's
practice in Minebea case 145 . In the contested decisions 146
,
the Commission rejected the
143
See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 2 1 March 1 99 1 . Report of cases,
1992, pages 1-1689.
144
Article 9.3.3, URAA, supra note 20.
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Case c- 188/88, NMB (Deutschland) GmbH., NMB (Italia) Sri., NMB (U.K) Limited, v.
Commission 1992E.C.R. 1689.
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Commission Decision 88/327/EEC, 88/328/EEC, 88/329/EEC of 22 April 1988
concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain imports of
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refund applications by the importers. According to the Commission's reasoning, it could
not be justified to grant refunds to related importers who took only a single jump,
because those reimbursements would increase the risk of disguised dumping by the
related importers and would bring up discrimination of independent imports 147 . However,
the Commission's understanding contains a couple of illogical aspects. First, the risk of
disguised dumping has nothing to do with the double jump requirement. Whatever the
price increase would be, the importer will have the same opportunity to give a disguised
discount to his or her customers so as to allow them to sell at dumped prices 148 . The only
difference is the amount of the hidden discounts. Therefore, the risk of disguised
dumping remains exactly the same. Second, with regard to the discrimination, the
Commission's view could be sustained only where independent importers who have
purchased goods at an increased price, paid the anti-dumping duty and passed the double
increase onto its customer in full 149 . However, if independent importers pass only a
proportion of the increase in the export price to the resale price, the result would be
discriminatory to related importers because related importers cannot bear the burden of
the anti-dumping duties without prejudicing the right to obtain refunds 150 . Contrary to the
Commission's explanation, the double jump requirement generates an unfair consequence
for related importers by restricting their price policy, which is crucial to keep their market
shares. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice upheld the Commission's practice by saying
that;
certain ballbearings originating in Singapore, 1988 O.J. (LI 48) 26,28,31.
XA1See id.
]4
*See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, supra note 143.
mSee id.
mSee id.
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As the Commission correctly pointed out, the only difference between the
GATT Anti-Dumping Code and the Community Regulation with respect to the
construction of the export price is that, whereas the Code merely lays down the
principle that allowance should be made for costs incurred between importation
and resale, "including duties and taxes", the Community Regulation specifies
certain duties and other costs, including anti-dumping duties, for which allowance
must be made. It follows that there is no inconsistency between the basic
regulation and the Anti-Dumping Code 151 .
Under the URAA, the reasoning of the Court of Justice is no longer persuasive since it
clarifies that anti-dumping duties should not be deducted as a cost.
Article 11 (10) of the new Regulation incorporates the changes in the URAA but
they are not identical. While the URAA provides three situations which must be taken
into account in re-constructing the export price 152
,
the new Regulation mentions only one
situation, evidence that the duty is duly reflected in resale prices and subsequent selling
prices 153 . This provision seems to emphasize the price consistency from importers to end
users. Thus, in order to take advantage of the provision, sales subsidiaries in the EC
would have to maintain the consistent price pattern 154 . As a result, the partial
implementation by the EC could negate the effort in the URAA because it implies that the
EC will impose a heavier burden of proof which requires the related importers to provide
]S]See case c-1 88/88, supra note 145.
lS2See supra, p. 34.
153New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 11 (10).
154Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 68.
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evidence of the price consistency even by dealers and end users whose prices are not
controlled by the related importers 155 .
(b) Target Deadlines in Refund Proceedings
The URAA introduces a couple of important time limits in proceedings
concerning the refunds of anti-dumping duties. Article 9. 3. 2 of the URAA provides that
refunds for anti-dumping duties shall normally take place within twelve months, and in
no case more than eighteen months, after the date on which a request for a refund has
been made by an importer of the product subject to the anti-dumping duty 156 . It further
provides that the actual payment of the authorized refunds should normally be made
within ninety days of the reimbursement decision 157 .
Article 1 1 (8) (c) of the new Regulation incorporates those time limits without
alteration. Even though the provision contains some flexibility, it will require the
Commission to speed-up the refund proceedings, which has usually taken two or three
years to complete 158 . Moreover, Article 1 1 (8) (a) provides that a refund request may be
lodged within six months of the date on which the amount of definitive duties to be levied
was duly determined by the authorities or of the date on which a decision was made
definitively to collect the amounts secured by way of provisional duty. The URAA does
155
See Gary N. Horlick, How the GATT Became Protectionist, An Analysis ofthe Uruguay
Round Draft Final Anti-Dumping Code, 27 Journal of World Trade (Law-Economics-
Public Policy) October 1993, 5-17, at 8.
156URAA, supra note 20, art 9.3.2.
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Vulmust and Waer, supra note 79, at 85; see also Vinyl Acetate Monomer (USA) 1991
O.J. (L80) 53; Hydraulic Excavators (Japan) 1989 O.J.(L108) 17; Polyester Yarn (USA)
1987 0.J. (L102)25.
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not contain a similar provision. It seems probable that the extension of the lodging period
results from Commission recognition of criticism of the EC past refund procedure 159 . This
change will give importers more time to consider the refundability and prepare the
information required by Article 1 1 (8) (b). It will also allow importers to pool more
import transactions 160 .
2. SAMPLING
Article 17 of the new Regulation provides that in cases where the number of
complaints, exporters or importers, types of product or transactions are large, the
investigation may be limited to a reasonable number of parties, products or transactions
by using samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available at the
time of selection, or to the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports
which can reasonably be investigated within the time available 161 . This is a far more
thorough rule than Regulation 2423/88, which merely puts the sampling techniques as
one of the alternative methods for the establishment of normal values 162 . However, the
Commission interpreted the scope of the sampling techniques quite broadly in its actual
application. For instance, in Bicycles, a exporter claimed that the use of production and
sales data led to the flawed sample because sales and production trends were also the
basis for the injury determination 163 . The Council concluded that the Commission was
entitled to use a sampling technique which yielded a representative selection of
159Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 67.
mSee id. at 68.
161New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 17(1).
162Council Regulation 2423/88, supra note 15, art. 2 (13).
163
Bicycle ( Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand ) 1996 O.J. ( L91) 1.
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community producers 164 . In its reasoning, the Council agreed that Regulation 2423/88 did
not provide for the use of sampling techniques for the purpose of injury determination 165 .
However, it also noted that, since Regulation 2423/88 did not require the Commission to
investigate each complaining Community producer either, the Commission's usage of the
sampling technique in determination of injury was not against Regulation 2423/88 166 . The
reasoning seems hard to escape from the criticism in that the Council's reasoning came
out of another discretionary interpretation because it rested on a simple circular argument.
From this point of view, Article 17(1) of the new Regulation will provide more
understandable legal bases for the Commission's usage of the sampling technique.
Article 17 (2) authorizes the Commission to use ultimate power in the selection of
parties, types of products or transactions' 67 . However, preference shall be given to
choosing a sample in consultation with, and with the consent of, the parties concerned,
provided that such parties make themselves known and make sufficient information
available, within three weeks of initiation, to enable a representative sample to be
chosen 168 . Besides, this provision would seem to imply that the sampling will already take
place at the stage where it is decided which parties should complete the questionnaire
response 169 . The Commission's past practice has added pressure to exporters and
producers. In the past, the Commission took the position that all foreign producers and
exporters should respond to the questionnaire to be treated as co-operating parties and
mSee id.
]65See id.
l66See id.
167
Article 17 (2), Council Regulation 3283/94, supra note 16.
> 6&See id.
l69Vulmust and Waer, supra note 49, at 65.
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sampling would only be considered at the stage of verification 170 . The EC anti-dumping
questionnaires have become more and more difficult to respond to within designated
time, because the Commission requires more and more related evidence to be presented
in the questionnaires, instead of relying on on-the-spot-verification for a detailed
examination of the data obtained by the parties concerned 171 . As a result, the earlier
initiation of sampling procedure will free unselected exporters and producers from a
onerous burden and seems to be a reasonable alternative because at any rate, responses
form unselected exporters and producers has not been used at later stage 172 .
Article 17 (3) codified a Commission's practice concerning the right to individual
treatment in sampling situations. Requests for individual treatments have been made
frequently by exporters from non-market economy countries. In Bicycle, the Commission
expressed its view with respect to the nature of the right to individual treatment 173 . The
Commission considered the individual treatment as a limited right which could be
granted only where the individual treatment could give a more proportionate and effective
remedy against injurious dumping than a single country-wide duty 174 . The basis for the
view was that the EC anti-dumping regulation aimed at the country and the product on
which the duty was imposed as the subject matter in the regulation 175 .
mSee id., at 65.
171
Ivo Van Bael, EEC Anti-Dumping Law and Procedure Revisited, Journal of World Trade
( Law-Economics-Public Policy ), April 1990, at 17.
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The new provision, in conformity with the Commission's said view, gives
exporters and producers a limited right to individual treatment. It provides that in cases
where sampling has taken place, individual margins of dumping shall be calculated for
producers and exporters not initially selected which submit necessary information within
the time limits provided for in the new Regulation, except where co-operating producers
and exporters are so large that the individual treatment would be unduly burdensome and
prevent the timely completion of the investigation 176 . In practice, the Commission has
granted an individual treatment on the basis of the same reasoning as in the new
provision 177 .
Article 1 7 (4) sets out the best-information-available rule in case of a material
degree of continuing non-co-operation 178 . However, a new sample may be selected when
there is sufficient time to do so 179 . This provision seems reasonable as long as it applies
to domestic and foreign producers equally 180 .
3. ANTI-ABSORPTION
Anti-absorption duties are imposed where exporters have absorbed anti-dumping
duties. Even though neither the anti-dumping Agreements nor Article VI ofGATT has
provided that the importers actually bear anti-dumping duties, the EC has allowed the
176New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 13 (3).
177
Certain Polyester Yarns ( India ) 1994 O.J. ( L320 ) l("As individual consideration of
these three Indian producers was not unduly burdensome and did not delay the
investigation, the Commission investigated these three companies separately.").
178New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 17 (4).
m
Id.
180Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 65.
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Community authorities to impose so-called anti-absorption duties since the introduction
of Article 13(10) of Regulation 2423/88m . The amount of absorption of anti-dumping
duty has been calculated on the basis of the difference between the import price of the
product concerned during the period of the initial investigation and the import price
during the period following imposition of a provisional anti-dumping duty 182 . Those
relevant import prices could be obtained on the basis of customs statistics. In calculation
of the amount of anti-absorption duties, the Commission has examined some of the
related factors; such as quality of products, market trends, currency fluctuation, changes
in raw material prices, which could have influenced the fluctuation of import prices after
imposition of original anti-dumping duties 183 . However, the Commission has not
considered any changes of the normal value in calculating the amount of absorbed
duty 184 . In other words, the fact that import prices have not increased by the amount of
the original anti-dumping duty was regarded as the absolute evidence of the absorption of
anti-dumping duties. It seems quite illogical to assess an anti-dumping duty without
regard to the normal value; because, the normal value is a prerequisite element in
calculation of an anti-dumping duty.
In response to the criticism, the new Regulation introduces two modified features
in Article 12. It provides that the dumping margins must be recalculated before anti-
mSee id, at 69.
182
See, for example, Silicon Metal ( the People's Republic of China ) 1992 O.J. ( L170 ) 1;
Woven Polyolefin Sacks ( the People's Republic of China ) 1993 O.J. ( L215 ) 1.
mSee id.
184
See Creally, supra note 6, at 98. The former article was drafted in such terms that the
Community authorities did not intent to look at the exporter's position, merely that of the
importer, thereby ignoring normal value.
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absorption duties are imposed 185 . Besides, in contrast to the former provision, it requires
the Community authorities to take into account the changes in the normal values 186 .
Therefore, the legality controversy over the methodology used to calculate amount of
absorption of anti-dumping duties will no longer be a source of exporters' argument.
Moreover, the Explanatory Memorandum now clarifies that anti-dumping duties
will not be treated as a cost in the construction of export prices when conclusive evidence
is provided that the duty is duly reflected in resale prices and the subsequent selling prices
in the Community 187 . In other words, the concept of the duty as a non-cost applies to the
method of the construction of the export price in the anti-absorption procedure 188 .
Generally speaking, those changes will improve the transparency in the anti-absorption
proceedings and provide much fairer bases for the amount of the anti-absorption duties.
However, in anti-absorption cases, where an anti-absorption investigation
involves a re-examination of normal values, imports may be made subject to registration
pending the outcome of the investigation 189 . This provision is clearly discriminatory since
the registration requirement is not applicable to normal interim reviews carried out by the
Commission 190 .
185New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 12 (2).
m
Id. Art. 12(5).
187Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 69.
m
See, Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 58, at 6.
In common with the refund provisions, duties cannot, in contrast to the
position now, be treated as a cost incurred between importation and resale in cases
of a re-construction of export prices, where measures have impacted on prices or
where there is legitimate reason why prices have not increased following the
measures.
189New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 12 (5).
mSee Van Bael, supra note 64, at 244.
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4. REGISTRATION OF IMPORTS
The URAA allows national authorities to withhold the appraisement of imports in
three situations. The first circumstance is the violation of an undertaking. If an
undertaking is violated, definitive duties may be levied in accordance with the URAA on
products entered for consumption not more than 90 days before the application of such
provisional measures 191 . However, such retroactive assessment cannot apply to imports
entered before the violation of the undertaking 192 . The next situation is the review
proceedings for new comers. If a product, subject to anti-dumping duties, is imported by
the unrelated exporters or producers, the authorities must promptly carry out a review for
the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping for the exporters or producers
in question 193 . In such cases, the authorities may withhold appraisement and/or request
guarantees to ensure that anti-dumping duties can be levied retroactively to the date of the
initiation of the review 194 . Finally, a definitive anti-dumping duty can be levied
retroactively for not more that 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional
measures, where the two conditions are met 195 . One condition is that there should be a
history of dumping which cause injury or the importer knew, or should have previously
known the existence of dumping and injury 196 . And the second condition pertains to the
injury caused by massive imports of the product which seriously undermine the remedial
191URAA
,
supra note 20, art. 8.6
m
Id.
mId art. 9.5.
m
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effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty 197 . In such cases, the authorities may withhold
appraisement as may be necessary to retroactively collect anti-dumping duties' 98 .
The EC's new Regulation sets out general guidelines about the registration
procedure in Article 14 (5). It provides that the Commission, after consultation with the
Anti-Dumping Committee, direct the customs authorities to take the appropriate steps to
register imports, so that the measures may subsequently be applied against those imports
from the date of such registration 199 . It also provides that registration should be
introduced by a form of regulation which contains the purpose of the registration and the
estimated amount of future liability, and that the period of registration cannot exceed
nine months200 . This provision seems to comply with the counterpart of the URAA.
However, the new Regulation widened the scope of the retroactivity. Under the
new Regulation, contrary to the URAA, there are five situations in which the Community
authorities applies duties retroactively201 . In cases of massive dumping and the newcomer
review, the new Regulation reproduced the provisions of the URAA202 . However, the new
Regulation permits the registration of imports in case of withdrawal from undertaking,
which is inconsistent with the URAA in that the URAA allows the withholding of
appraisement only in the violation of undertakings203 . Furthermore, even though there are
no provisions on anti-circumvention and anti-absorption, the new Regulation added the
w
Id. art. 10.6(H).
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Id. art. 10.7.
199New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 14 (5).
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two situations in the range of the registration procedure. Article 12 (5) of the new
Regulation provides that imports may be subject to registration in cases of anti-absorption
investigations involving a re-examination of normal values. And, Article 13 (3) also
requires registration of imports in anti-circumvention proceedings. Consequently, if the
registration provisions with respect to anti-circumvention and anti-absorption are applied
in concrete cases, there would possibly be a WTO challenge in near future204 .
5. UNDERTAKINGS .
Article 8.3 of the URAA provides that undertakings offered by exporters need not
be accepted if the authorities consider their acceptance impractical; for example, if the
number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including
reasons of general policy.
The new Regulation reproduced the provision in Article 8 (3). In practice, the
Community authorities have enjoyed wide discretion in accepting or rejecting
undertakings offered by exporters205 . The Commission's discretion with respect to the
rejection of undertakings has been expressed in various forms206 . For example, in
Mechanical Alarm Clocks, the Commission stated that the conditions of the undertaking
offered would not permit adequate monitoring of compliance with the terms of the
undertaking207 . And in Hardboard, the Commission rejected the undertaking on the
ground of the breach of a previous undertaking208 . Besides, in Vinyl Acetate Monomer,
204Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 71
.
205See Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 8, at 98.
206Seeid. at 99-100.
207Mechanical Alarm Clocks ( GDR, USSR ) 1980 O.J. (L344) 34.
208Hardboard ( Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden ) 1983 O.J. (L361) 6.
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the non-existence under Canadian legislation of the possibility of terminating an anti-
dumping proceeding by accepting an undertaking was a ground for the Commission's
rejection209 . Compared to the past practice, how will the new provision affect the future
undertaking system? It seems probable that the fact that undertakings can be rejected on
the basis of the reasons of general policy will give the Community authorities even more
discretion in deciding the practicability of undertakings. This change seems to be in
opposition of the main trend of the URAA; in that, generally speaking, it should give
more specific and less discretionary rules.
Article 8 (3) of the new Regulation now requires the Community authorities to
provide for the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider acceptance of an
undertaking as inappropriate210 . According to the past practice, it was very rare that the
Community authorities published the reasons for rejecting an undertaking offered by
exporters211 . This change is expected to enhance the transparency in accepting or rejecting
undertakings and give the future undertakers useful data for a successful offer of an
undertaking.
Article 8 (4) imposes a new obligation upon parties offering an undertaking.
Contrary to the past practice, the undertaking offerers now must provide a non-
confidential version of the undertaking, which can be made available to interest parties212 .
However, as the contents in price undertakings is considered as a very confidential matter
in the business world, the importance of the provision in actual cases is quite doubtful213 .
209Vinyl Acetate Monomer (Canada ) 1984 OJ. (LI 70) 70.
210New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 8 (3); URAA, supra note 20, art. 8.3.
2uSee Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 8, at 99.
212New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 8 (4).
213Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 66.
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6. REVIEW FOR NEWCOMER
Article 1 1 (4) provides a set of new provisions with respect to newcomer review
procedures. The newcomer review has been developed by EC practice and taken over in
the URAA as a result of the Uruguay Round214 .
The first change occurred in this area is that the new provision imposes a heavier
burden of proof for being considered a newcomer to exporters asking for the review.
According to past practices, the exporters were required to show that they had not
exported the products concerned to the Community during the original investigation
period, that they were not related to, or associated with, any of the companies subject to
the anti-dumping duty and that they started such exports after the original investigation
period or had a firm intention of doing so215 . The new Regulation tightened the third
requirement by requiring the exporters to show either that they have actually exported to
the Community in the investigation period or that they have entered into an irrevocable
contractual obligation to export a significant quantity216 .
Furthermore, the new Regulation incorporates an important improvement in the
URAA that no anti-dumping duty shall apply as long as the review is in progress217 . It
2
"ld. at 67. Article 9.5 of the URAA provides that:
[S]uch a review shall be initiated and carried put in an accelerated basis,
compared to normal duty assessment and review proceedings in the importing
country. No anti-dumping duties shall be levied on imports from such exporters or
producers while the review is being carried out. The authorities may, however,
withhold appraisement and/or request guarantees to ensure that, should such a
review result in determination of dumping in respect of such producers or
exporters, anti-dumping duties can be levied retroactively to the date of the
initiation of the review.
2]5See,for example, Certain Polyester Yarn ( India ) 1994 O.J. ( L320 ) 1.
216New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 1 1 (4) (a).,
217Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 67.
50
provides that the Commission Regulation initiating a review shall repeal the duty in force
for the newcomer by amending the Regulation which imposed the anti-dumping duty218 .
However, the temporary exemption from the anti-dumping duty does not exclude the
possibility of retroactive anti-dumping duties on the products imported during the
investigation period ofnewcomer review. The Commission shall make imports of the
newcomer subject to registration by the Regulation initiating the newcomer review in
order to ensure that anti-dumping duties can be applied retroactively to the date of the
initiation of the newcomer review219 .
Article 1 1 (4) (c) provides that the provisions concerning the newcomer review
will not apply where duties have been imposed under Article 9 (6) which sets out rules of
imposition of anti-dumping duties by the sampling techniques. In contrast, there is no
counterpart in the URAA. Thus, this unilateral limitation seems likely to be challenged in
the WTO if the Commission were to actually refuse to initiate newcomer reviews in such
circumstances220 .
7. NEW STANDING REQUIREMENT
Article 5 (4) provides that an investigation shall not be initiated unless it has been
determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to,
the complaint expressed by Community producers of the like product, in that the
complaint has been made by or on behalf of the Community industry. And it further
defines that in order to be considered to be made 'by or on behalf of the Community
industry', the complaint should be supported by those Community producers whose
2,8New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 1 1 (4) (b).
2i9See id.
220Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 67.
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collective output constitutes more than 50% of the total production of the like product
produced by that portion of the Community industry expressing either support for or
opposition to the complaint221 . However, no investigation shall be initiated when
Community producers expressly supporting the complaint account for less than 25% of
total production of the like product produced by the Community industry222 . These rules
are an exact reproduction of Article 5.4 of the URAA which is presumably inspired by
standing problems in some U.S. cases223 . It seems to be a proper development in that it
clarifies the definition of major proportion of the Community industry.
On the other hand, Article 5 (4) could be a quite burdensome requirement on the
Commission's side. For instance, the Commission is required to decide whether it will
initiate proceedings or not within 45 days of the lodging of the complaint224 . Therefore,
the Commission must finish the examination of the standing requirement and the
determination of de minimis market-share within such a limited period. Consequently, the
new standing requirement will exert pressure on the Commission in cases involving
complicated standing issues225 .
8. SUSPENSION OF ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES
Anti-dumping duties may be suspended for a period of nine months by
Commission decision where market conditions have temporarily changed to the extent
that injury would be unlikely to resume as a result of the suspension, and provided that
221New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 5 (4).
222
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224New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 5 (9).
225Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 64.
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the Community industry has been given an opportunity to comment and these comments
have been taken into account226 . It would be an arguable if it gives the Community
industry the right to veto a Commission proposal to suspend the anti-dumping duties. If
that is the case, it seems hard to avoid an argument over protectionism. And the
suspension measure can be extended for a period of a maximum of one year if the
Council so decides, by simple majority, on a proposal from the Commission227 . To date,
the suspension of anti-dumping measures has been targeting products having cyclical
market characteristics, such as DRAMs228 (dynamic random access memories) and
EPROMs229 (erasable programmable read only memories). It appears to be a proper
application of the suspension measure because the cyclical characteristic of those
products needs some temporary, not permanent measures. Finally, anti-dumping measures
may at any time be re-instated if the reason for the suspension is no longer applicable230 .
C. NEW ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURE
1. EFFORTS DURING THE URUGUAY ROUND
226New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 14 (4).
221
Id.
228
Dynamic Random Access Memories (Japan, the Republic of Korea) 1995 O.J. (LI 26)
58.
229
Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories (Japan) 1995 O.J. (LI 65) 26.
230New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 14 (4).
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The inclusion of new and effective anti-circumvention measures in the URAA
was one of the key objectives of the EC during the Uruguay Round231 . A major issue in
the anti-circumvention negotiation during the Uruguay Round was to clarify what kinds
of circumstances were enough to justify the application of anti-circumvention measures to
imported parts or to products assembled with such parts in a third country without
proceeding full procedure for the imposition of anti-dumping duties232 . The Dunkel Draft
provided several provisions concerning the measures233 . For example, Article 10 and 12
of the Dunkel Draft provided several rules for different kinds of circumvention. Article
10.4 dealt with 'country hopping', a situation where a company subject to a anti-dumping
order issued by a country resumes dumping through a related company located in another
country to the same country
234
. In case of country hopping, the article allowed the
authorities to impose anti-dumping duties retroactively up to 1 50 days prior to the date of
the initial suspension of liquidation235 . Article 10.5 provided another circumvention case
in which an anti-dumping order could be imposed retroactively for the same period as in
country hopping cases. A third country assembly was the subject matter in this provision.
231
See Simon Holmes, Anti-Circumvention under the European Union 's New Anti-
Dumping Rules, Journal of World Trade (Law-Economics-Public Policy), June 1995 29
n3 at 164.
232See Leebron, supra note 18, at 20.
233
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No.B4-7013, 1992).
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For example, if a company in country A, subject to an anti-dumping order issued by
country B, assembled the products with parts originating in Country A in a third country
through a related company and exported the products to country B, it would constitute a
case dealt under article 10.5 of the Dunkel Draft236 . As to the assembling in importing
countries, Article 12 required that the cost of the imported parts not be less than 70% of
the total cost of all parts and that the value added by the assembly operation in the
importing country shall not exceed 25% of the ex-factory cost of the finished product237 .
Despite the fact that anti-circumvention was one of the major issues fiercely
debated during the Uruguay Round, the matter was not shown in the URAA because the
draft anti-circumvention provisions included in the Dunkel Draft were opposed by
various exporting countries238 . However, the parties agreed to continue discussions and
this matter has been referred to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices established
under URAA239 .
2. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EC ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURE
On 22 June, 1987, the Council of the European Community adopted a regulation
which amended the European Community's Anti-dumping laws240 . The so-called
Screwdriver Regulation extended the scope of anti-dumping duties to products which had
been assembled in the Community provided that they met certain criteria. The principal
236
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1987 O.J. (LI 67) 9 (hereinafter Screwdriver Regulation).
55
stimulus to the enactment of the Screwdriver Regulation was the vulnerable provisions
regarding assessment and enforcement of anti-dumping regulations which could have
been evaded easily241 . The extension of the anti-dumping laws to products assembled in
the Community was generally understood as a counteraction against Japanese companies
who went through loopholes in the Community's anti-dumping regulation. The fact that
the first four anti-dumping investigations initiated under the Screwdriver Regulation were
all targeted Japanese companies supported the said view242 . In fact, the concern over the
ineffectiveness of anti-dumping regulations in circumvention areas had been enlarged in
the European Community over the past years before the enactment of the Screwdriver
Regulation. The circumvention of anti-dumping duties became a more serious problem in
the European Community in connection with declining competitiveness of European
industries
243
. During early 1980s, Japanese companies began to expand production
facilities in the European Community to overcome the relatively high tariff and non-tariff
barriers to Japanese products244 . For example, in areas of photocopiers, where the
241
See Patrick J. McDermott, Extending the reach oftheir anti-dumping laws : The
European Community's "Screwdriver Assembly" Regulation, 20 Law & Policy in
International Business 315.
242
See id. nn. 4 & 5. Investigations of Japanese companies manufacturing electronic
typewriters and electronic weighing scales were opened in September, 1 987, and a
company making hydraulic excavators was targeted in October, 1987. A fourth
investigation, of Japanese companies producing photocopiers, was announced in
February, 1988. The first two investigations were announced by the Commission on
September 1, 1987, following complaints from Community producers. Electronic Scales,
1987 O.J. (C235) 3, and Electronic Typewriters, 1987 O.J. (C235) 2. The third
investigation was announced by the Commission on October 23, 1987. Hydraulic
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Japanese had achieved a dominant market position in the world market including the
European Community, almost all the Japanese photocopier producers were planning to
set up new facilities or expand existing capacity245 . In response to the movements by the
Japanese producers, the Community producers complained that these expansions and
investments by the Japanese producers were an effort to circumvent anti-dumping duties
and would give very little favorable influence to job market and technical development in
the European Community246 . In such a circumstance, the Committee on External
Economic Relations of the European Parliament released a report on 3 July, 1986,
encouraging the Commission and the Council to take steps to anti-circumvention
measures
247
. Then, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Regulation. The
proposal was adopted by the Council on 22 June, 1987 with several amendments. This
has been called the 'Screwdriver Regulation' because the goal of the Regulation was to
protect the Community industries from foreign manufacturers who had evaded anti-
dumping measures by simple screwdriver assembly techniques in the Community248 .
3. SCREWDRIVER REGULATION
The Screwdriver Regulation allowed the Commission to assess anti-dumping
duties on products assembled or produced in the European Community if three conditions
were met249 .
245
Seeid. at 318.
246See id.
241See id.
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First, the assembler or producer must be related to or associated with a foreign
exporter whose products are subject to a definitive anti-dumping duty250 . However, since
the Screwdriver Regulation did not provide detailed guideline, it was not clear as to what
kind of relationship had to exist between the party who was carrying out the assembly or
production in the Community and the manufacturer whose exports were subject to an
anti-dumping duty251 . Generally, the definition for a related party was conceived as a
corporate relationship between two parties252 . According to the GATT Understanding,
which was reached in 1982 about the definition of related party in determining domestic
industry, companies could be considered to be related when one controlled the other; or
when both were jointly controlled or controlled by a third party, provided that there were
grounds for believing that the effect of the relationship was enough to cause the domestic
producers to behave differently from other domestic producers who were not related253 .
On the other hand, the meaning of the associated parties contained a much broader
definition than the concept of the related parties, which could reach beyond the existence
of a corporate relationship254 . The definition of the associated party was considered to
cover a contractual agreement between two parties255 . The Commission proposal for
250Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note 12, art. 13 (10) (a).
251
Gerwin Van Gerven, New Anti-Circumvention Rules in EEC Anti-Dumping Law,
International Lawyer, Fall 1988, at 817.
252Seeid. at 818.
253See id.
254See id.
255See id. n. 46. In Nachi Fujikoshi Corp. V. Council, the Court of Justice stated that:
[U]ndertakings which are associated in business means not only
undertakings which, under the legislation governing limited companies or groups
of companies, are interconnected, but those which maintain other contractual or
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adoption of the Screwdriver Regulation did not mention the concept of the associated
party
256
. The reason that the Council added the concept of the associated party seemed to
have been indicated that anti-circumvention measures were not only feasible when one
party was directly or indirectly controlled by the other party but also between independent
parties257 . In Electronic Scales, the Commission found that TEC(UK) Ltd. was a
subsidiary ofTEC (Japan) and that TEC-Keylard had substantial capital links and close
economic and commercial links with TEC(Japan)258 . In this case, the Commission's
justification was based on the concept of corporate links. In Electronic Typewriters,
Silver Reed International(Europe) Ltd contended that it should not be included in the
investigation because the assembly was not carried out by Silver Reed but by Astec
Europe Ltd259 . The Commission held, however, that Astec Europe Ltd. was in essence
those of Silver Reed. It noted that Astec Europe Ltd simply assembled the parts of
typewriters which were delivered to its premises by Silver Reed. Furthermore, these
assembled typewriters were exclusively sold on the Community market by the Silver
Reed Group which bore all the costs between importation of parts and sales of the
finished product. The Regulation did not provide a detailed guideline for those concepts.
Unlike Electronic Typewriters, the commission used the concept of the associated party
for the determination of the degree of the relationship between the parties. As a result,
non-contractual relationships which create a special link, regardless of the
relationships created by the very fact of the purchase or sale transaction.
256See id.
257See id. a\S\9
258
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the first requirement could be satisfied by any kind of a business relationship between the
original dumper and the assembler.
Second, the assembly or production must have been started or substantially
increased after the opening of the anti-dumping investigation260 . In case that assembly
production started or increased after the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty,
there was a controversy concerning whether the anti-circumvention investigation was
considered as a new procedure or a review procedure261 . The wording of the Screwdriver
Regulation implied that the anti-circumvention investigation with regard to products
assembled or produced in the Community should be considered as a new procedure under
Article 7 of Regulation 2 1 76/84262 . Consequently, proceedings with regard to products
assembled in the Community did not have any impact upon the duration of anti-dumping
measures with regard to the imported products and upon the sunset clause under Article
15 of Regulation 2176/84. And also, a complainant did not need to follow the one year
lapse requirement for a request for investigation, which otherwise would have been
required in review procedures.
Third, the value of parts and materials from the exporting country subject to the
duty must exceed the value of all other parts or materials by at least 50%263 . In other
words, a product assembled or produced in the Community could be subject to an anti-
dumping duty if the value of the parts and materials originating in the country of
260Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note 12, art. 13 (10) (a).
261
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exportation of the products subject to the anti-dumping duty were more than 60% of the
total value of all parts and materials used in the production. This provision in the
Screwdriver Regulation differed form the Commission Proposal in two points. First, the
Screwdriver Regulation softened the minimum part requirement. The Proposal required
approximately 55% of the total value264 . The reason seemed to protect certain Community
member states who specialized in low cost assembly and their foreign investment
activities
265
. Second, while the Proposal dealt with only the simple ratio of foreign to
domestic components, the Screwdriver Regulation provided a statutory ground for the
Community Institutions to take into account factors other than the 60/40 ratio
requirement266 . As a result, if the products concerned involved high technological
development and employment effect, the Community could make a exception regardless
of the minimum part requirement test267 . The value of parts and materials used in those
anti-circumvention assembly was usually determined on the basis of the company's
purchase prices of the parts or materials when delivered to the factories in the
Community, namely on an into-factory duty paid basis268 . However, in Electronic
2M
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costs incurred in the assembly or production operation and of the research and
development carried out and the technology applied within the Community.").
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Typewriters269 , some companies' purchase prices were not used since they did not
adequately reflect their true value. In this case, the sales prices were adjusted in order to
ensure that they reflected the companies' purchase prices of those parts manufactured by
third parties on the totality of the companies' own production costs plus the SGA
expenses incurred by them and shown in their public accounts270 .
The Screwdriver Regulation was incorporated into article 13(10) of Regulation
2423/88. Later, Article 13(10) of Regulation 2423/88 was challenged in GATT by the
Japanese government271 . In that case, the Panel noted that duties imposed by the EC on
products assembled in the EC were contrary to Article HI (2) ofGATT which prohibits
internal taxes which discriminate against imported products and were not justified under
Article XX (d). It further noted that undertakings given by assembly plants to limit the
use of Japanese parts were contrary to Article III (4) ofGATT which prohibits treating
imported products less favorably than domestic products. The EC's acceptance of the
ruling was conditional upon a satisfactory solution in the Uruguay Round for the problem
of circumvention272 . As mentioned earlier, since there was no solution in the URAA, the
conditional acceptance does not have a practical meaning. However, the Commission has
not applied the provision after the GATT ruling273 .
4. NEW ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION RULES
Electronic Scales (Japan) 1988 O.J. (L101) 1.
270See id.
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The new EC Regulation provides a set of new anti-circumvention provisions. The
EC refer the legality of the new anti-circumvention rules to the Ministerial Declaration274 .
The EC interpreted the declaration as permitting individual members to deal with the
circumvention problem unilaterally, pending on a multilateral solution via the GATT
Anti-Dumping Committee275 .
(a) Non-Assembly Circumvention
Article 13 (1) of the new Regulation covers virtually all forms of
circumvention276 . Since this provision defines circumvention so generally, some liberal
Member States opposed the adoption of the provision. In response, the Commission
officials suggested that this provision will not applied in cases of assembly operations in
either third countries or the EC because Article 13 (2) cover the assembly circumvention
with more specific rules277 . And, according to a Commission official, Article 13(1)
applies only where there is no reason to do something other than to circumvent anti-
dumping duties278 .
(b) Assembly Circumvention
274Seeid.atl65.
275See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 66, at 7.
276
See Holmes, supra note 231, at 162. There are two types of circumventions, assembly
circumvention and non-assembly circumvention. The assembly circumvention is one that
avoid anti-dumping duties by assembly operations in the EC or third countries. Non-
assembly circumvention includes circumvention of anti-dumping duties by making a
wrong origin declaration, importing "knock down" kits and changing characteristics of
the product concerned.
211SeeHo\mes, supra note 231, at 172.
2nSee id.
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Article 13 (2) deals with the assembly circumvention, which is applicable to both
assembly operation in the EC and in third countries279 . It should be noted that the
provision does not require the relationship between the manufacturers and the assemblers.
The requirement of the relationship for the original dumper has been a basic pre-condition
for a finding of circumvention under the EC's past regulations280 . Thus, even unrelated
assemblers can be the target of the new anti-circumvention measure.
The provision sets out three tests for the determination of circumvention. First, it
provides that "the operation started or substantially increased since, or just prior to, the
initiation of the anti-dumping investigation and the parts concerned are from the country
subject to measures"281 . This criterion is almost similar to the former counterpart
provisions in the Screwdriver Regulation and Regulation 2423/88 except that the new
Regulation adds the phrase, 'just prior to the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation'.
It seems to intend to broaden the scope of anti-circumvention measure. Since, generally
speaking, investments in foreign countries need some lead time, the interpretation of this
provision would be highly crucial in applying the new anti-circumvention regulations.
Second, the new Regulation requires that the part constitute 60% or more of the
total value of the parts of the assembled product but the value added by the assembly
operation in the importing country may not exceed 25% of the ex-factory cost of the
finished product to extend an anti-dumping order to parts imported from the country
subject to the anti-dumping order282 . The 60% test means that parts used to make the
219See Van Bael, supra note 64, at 243.
2mSee supra p.58.
28 New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 13 (2)(I).
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assembled product, not the value of the product, should be more than 60%283 . On the
other hand, unlike the Screwdriver Regulation and Regulation 2423/88, the new
Regulation gives a safe-harbor percentage to the added value test. Thus, if the added
value is more than 25 % of the total manufacturing cost, then the anti-circumvention rules
do not apply. Contrary to the 60% test, the 25% test looks only at the value-added during
the assembly or completion operation284 . The 25% test stems from Article 12 of the
Dunkel Draft285 . Thus, the second criterion in the new Regulation is a mixture of the
existing 60/40 part test and the 25% added value test in the Dunkel Draft286 . This added
value test will provide more specific guidelines in business decision making, especially to
investors interested in the Community, and reduce more or less the range of discretion in
determining circumvention.
Finally, the assembly production should undermine the remedial effects of anti-
dumping duties287 . This new and controversial condition originated from the anti-
circumvention provisions in the Dunkel Text288 . This provision was included with
recognition of the criticism that the Screwdriver Regulation did not meet the essential
requirements under the Tokyo Round Anti-dumping Code because it assessed duties
without a separate finding that the components themselves had been dumped and that
2iiSee Holmes, supra note 231, at 167.
284
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See Hunter, supra note 234, AD Draft, art. 12. It provided that imported parts used in
assembly or production should exceed 70% of the value of all parts and added value
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287New Regulation, supra note 16, art. 13 (2) (iii).
2
™See Holmes, supra note 231, at!70.
65
injury had been occurred in the Community industry289 . In other words, if the assembly
plant is not causing any injury, there is no need to take anti-circumvention measures290 .
And, it should be noted that the new Regulation requires that there must be evidence of
dumping in relation to the normal values previously established for the like or similar
products291 . The reference to dumping does not mean a full analysis of dumping. The
Commission will use previously established normal values in comparison with the prices
of assembled products292 . However, since there may be a number of potential problems
occurred in assembly operations such as changes in models and gap in time between the
calculation of normal values and export prices, the Community authorities may well be
obliged to look at normal values again293 . Collectively speaking, since, even though the
new Regulation does not require the same injury test and finding of dumping, this
requirement provides an alternative methodology having similar effects. Thus, it is likely
to improve, more or less, transparency in anti-circumvention proceedings.
(c) New Certification Procedure
Article 13 (4) provides that products shall not be subject to registration or
measures where they are accompanied by a customs certificate declaring that the
importation of the goods does not constitute circumvention. This certificate will make
certain products, parts or exporters exempted from the scope of the anti-circumvention
2&9See McDermott, supra note 241, at 322.
290See Holmes, supra note 23 1 , at 1 7 1
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investigation from the moment it becomes clear that they should be so exempted2 **4 . And
according to the Explanatory Memorandum, the certificate can be obtained only after
initiation of a circumvention investigation295 .
294
See, Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 66, at 8.
295See id.
Chapter III
Conclusion
The new Regulation provides more detailed and clear-cut rules than the former
anti-dumping regulations. This is quite a positive evolution from the exporting countries'
views. The past regulations have left considerable discretion in the hands of the
Community authorities. Because of ambiguously defined rules, the Community
institutions could enjoy the margin of discretion both in the finding of dumping and the
determination of injury in the past296 . However, the new Regulation will reduce the range
of discretion more or less because the new Regulation provides more detailed rules in
almost every aspect of the anti-dumping area. Furthermore, the exporters will enjoy a
much broader legal certainty in future anti-dumping proceedings.
On the other hand, the new Regulation still contains a few unilateral provisions
which can be challenged under the WTO. It would be interesting to see how the EC
applies those unilateral rules to concrete cases and copes with the WTO challenges under
a much stronger dispute settlement system.
Collectively speaking, even though the new Regulation does not fully reflect the
changes occurred in the URAA, it follows the main stream of the URAA. Some experts
say that the keys to reasonable anti-dumping laws are predictability and substantive and
procedural fairness297 . In order to achieve predictability and fairness in the EC anti-
296
See generally Sylvia Ostry, Europe 1992 and the Evolution of the Multilateral Trading
System, 22 Case W. Res. J. Intl L. 3 1 1,326 (1990).
297Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 74.
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dumping proceedings, the Community institutions' strong will to build consistent and
unbiased practice should be accompanied with clear rules in the new Regulation.
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